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Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment:
Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments
Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury
April 1996
Abstract
We translate the results of the three reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted
during the 1980s into (a) impacts of a 10-percentage point increase in the Unemployment
Insurance (UI) replacement rate on the expected duration of unemployment; and (b) impacts of
adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits on the expected duration of unemployment.
Our approach is to use an equilibrium search and matching model, calibrated using data from the
bonus experiments and secondary sources. The results suggest that a 10-percentage point increase
in the UI replacement rate increases the expected duration of unemployment by .3 to 1.1 week
(a range consistent with, but only somewhat narrower than, the existing range of estimates), and
that adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits increases the expected duration of
unemployment by .05 to .2 week (which is toward the low end of existing estimates).

Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment:
Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments
Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury
I. Introduction
During the last 20 years, perhaps the most researched question about Unemployment
Insurance (UI) has been whether and to what degree increases in the UI replacement rate lengthen
UI recipients' unemployment spells. Yet estimates of the effect of UI on unemployment duration
have varied over a wide range. For example, Hamermesh (1977) provided an early (and muchquoted) "best estimate" that a 10-percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate—defined
as the ratio of the weekly UI benefit to the average weekly wage—increases the duration of
unemployment by about one-half week. But this "best estimate" was based on studies that found
impacts ranging from approximately zero to over 1.5 weeks. More recent studies have continued
to produce a wide range of estimates: Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) found that a 10-percentage
point increase in the replacement rate increases unemployment duration by about 1 week; Solon
(1985) found an impact of between one-half and one week; and Meyer (1990) found an impact
on the order of 1.5 weeks. Clearly, this is a rather broad range—one that gives relatively little
guidance in deciding whether claims that UI is a serious deterrent to job search should be taken
seriously and used as a basis for reforming the UI system.
A related issue that has received somewhat less attention in the literature concerns the
degree to which extending the potential duration of UI benefits affects the expected duration of
unemployment. A number of studies have estimated the impact of adding one week to the
potential duration of benefits on the expected duration of unemployment. All find evidence that
an increase in potential duration reduces search effort and increases the average length of
unemployment spells. But again the estimates vary widely: Newton and Rosen (1979) find that
an additional week of potential benefits raises the expected duration of unemployment by .4 to .5
week; Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) find an impact of .1 week; Solon (1985) finds an impact of
.3 week; Ham and Rea (1987) find an impact of .33 week; and Katz and Meyer (1990) find an
impact of .16 to .2 week. The differences among these estimates may seem small, but they do
matter. A typical UI benefit extension of ten weeks would increase the expected duration of
unemployment by as little as one week, or as much as four weeks, depending on which of these
estimates is correct.
During the mid- and late-1980s, three reemploy-ment bonus experiments were performed
in the United States that have the potential to narrow the range of estimates of how UI affects the
behavior of unemployed workers. Each experiment tested and estimated the effects of one or
more variants of a cash bonus paid to UI recipients who find rapid reemployment and cut short
their spell of insured unemployment (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987; Corson, Decker, Dunstan,
and Kerachsky 1992; O'Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995). Because each of the three
experiments randomly assigned UI claimants either to a control group or to a bonus-offered
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group, the experiments offer a potentially powerful way of discerning whether (and to what
extent) UI benefits are a benign or nondistortionary income transfer.
The reemployment bonus experiments provided clear evidence that UI benefits are not
merely a benign transfer. All three of the experiments found that bonus offers reduce the
duration of insured unemployment of bonus-offered UI recipients. But there is no simple "backof-the-envelope" way to translate the quantitative results of the reemployment bonus experiments
into estimates of the effects of increases in UI replacement rates or potential duration of benefits
on unemployment duration. The essence of the reemployment bonus is the offer of cash for rapid
reemployment, not a direct change in the UI replacement rate or the potential duration of benefits.
In this paper, we attempt to solve the problem of translating the observed effects of the
reemployment bonus into the effects that have been of most concern to economists and
policymakers—that is, the effects of changes in the UI replacement rate and in the potential
duration of UI benefits on unemployment duration. In section II, we offer a brief review of the
three reemployment bonus experiments that have been carried out. In section III, we develop an
equilibrium search/matching model that incorporates the relevant institutional characteristics of
the UI system in the United States. In section IV, we describe how we make use of the results
of the reemployment bonus experiments to calibrate the model—that is, to infer key unobservable
parameters of the model. Finally, in section V, we use the calibrated model to address the main
question—what are the implications of the results of the reemployment bonus experiments for the
relationship between UI benefits and unemployment duration?
In addition to yielding estimates of how increasing the UI replacement rate and potential
duration increase the expected duration of unemployment, the method we use yields estimates of
spillover effects of the UI system. That is, UI has the potential to affect the behavior and
employment outcomes of workers other than UI claimants—for example, workers who are
ineligible for UI (or "UI-ineligibles"). Because the model we use considers the effect of UI
benefits on these other groups of workers (as well as on UI claimants), we can estimate the
potentially important effect of changes in the replacement rate and potential duration of benefits
on workers other than UI claimants. Such spillover effects have only rarely been
considered—Levine's work (1993) is a recent exception.
II. The Reemployment Bonus Experiments
Table 1 summarizes the three reemployment bonus experiments and their results. Central
to each of the experiments is the notion of random assignment: One or more randomly chosen
groups of new UI claimants were offered a reemployment bonus, and another randomly chosen
group—the control group—received no special treatment. Random assignment was made in each
of the reemployment bonus experiments by referring to the last two digits of the Social Security
number. In the Illinois experiment, for example, UI claimants with a Social Security number
ending in 00 through 33 were assigned to the control group, whereas those with a Social Security
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number ending in 34 through 66 were offered a bonus. The power of random assignment is that,
if it is effectively carried out, then on average the observable and unobservable characteristics of
workers in the experimental and control groups will be identical. Accordingly, the only
difference between the experimental and control groups is that the experimental groups receive
a "treatment," and comparing the outcomes of the control and experimental groups is sufficient
to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of the experimental treatment on behavior.1
The earliest of the three reemployment bonus experiments, in Illinois, was also the
simplest in that it had just one treatment—a $500 bonus offered to new UI claimants who found
a job within 11 weeks and held that job for four months. Note that the base period earnings of
workers assigned to the treatment and control groups are essentially similar2 (see column 3 of
Table 1), suggesting that the random assignment was successful. (Similarly, the weekly benefit
amounts of the treatment and control groups, shown in column 4, are the same.) Column 5
shows the duration of insured unemployment for the experimental and control
groups—specifically, the weeks of insured unemployment during the full year of eligibility
following the initial claim for UI (the benefit year).3 Comparing the weeks of insured
unemployment received by the Illinois treatment group with the Illinois control group suggests
that the $500 bonus reduced the duration of insured unemployment by .71 week (19.27 - 18.56
= .71).4 This treatment effect, shown in column 6, suggests that financial incentives do influence
the job search behavior of unemployed workers.
Further, it is clear from data on earnings after reemployment (column 7) that the jobs
accepted by the bonus-offered workers did not pay significantly less than the jobs accepted by the
control group. The implication is that the bonus-offered workers did not lower their reservation
wages, cut short productive job search, and accept a poor job match (which would be evidenced
by a lower wage) simply to qualify for the bonus. Rather, the results suggest that to qualify for
the bonus, bonus-offered workers increased the intensity of their job search.

1
This is, of course, a rather rosy accounting of the virtues of social experimentation. For a discussion of the
possible pitfalls of experimentation, see Spiegelman and Woodbury (1990).
2

That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the difference between the base period earnings of the treatment
and control groups is zero at conventional significance levels.
3

We focus on the duration of insured unemployment during the full benefit year on the assumption that this best
captures the overall impact of the bonus on a worker’s propensity to become and remain reemployed.
4

Note that this is the bonus effect for workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits.
About half of the workers enrolled in the Illinois experiment were eligible for an additional 12 weeks of Federal
Supplemental Compensation (FSC). The bonus impact for these FSC-eligible workers appears to have been greater: for
state-regular eligibles and FSC-eligibles combined the bonus impact was 1.13 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987),
and for FSC-eligibles alone the bonus impact was 1.8 weeks (Davidson and Woodbury, 1991). In this paper, we restrict
our attention to Illinois claimants who were eligible only for state-regular benefits. This makes the Illinois results
comparable with the Pennsylvania and Washington results, in which UI claimants were eligible only for state-regular
benefits.
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The two experiments that followed Illinois—one in Pennsylvania and the other in
Washington State—each tested several bonus offers. These new treatments varied in two ways.
First, the length of the qualification period—the time within which a worker needed to find
reemployment in order to qualify for a bonus—varied across the treatments. In Pennsylvania,
qualification periods of 6 and 12 weeks were tried (see column 1 of Table 1). In Washington,
qualification periods of 20 percent and 40 percent of a claimant's potential duration of UI plus
one week—or about 6 and 11 weeks—were tried. Second, the size of the bonus offer varied
across the treatments. In Pennsylvania, bonus offers equal to three times and six times the
weekly UI benefit amount were tried—that is, about $500 and $1,000 on average (see column 2
of Table 1). In Washington, bonus offers of two times, four times, and six times the weekly UI
benefit amount were tried—that is, roughly $300, $600, and $900 on average. In both
Pennsylvania and Washington (as in Illinois), a worker had to hold the new job for four months
in order to receive a bonus.
The results of the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments are not entirely consistent,
but do suggest that larger bonus offers and longer qualification periods tend to reduce insured
unemployment by more than smaller bonus offers and shorter qualification periods (see column
7 of Table 1). One inconsistency arises in Washington, where the long qualification period/low
bonus treatment had a greater effect than would be expected based on the results of the other
Washington treatments. (Alternatively, the long qualification period/medium bonus treatment
could be viewed as anomalously low.) In Pennsylvania, the short qualification period/low bonus
treatment had nearly the same effect as the short qualification period/high bonus treatment, which
is also inconsistent.5
Comparing results across the three experiments poses additional puzzles. Mainly, the
Illinois treatment effect of .71 week is larger than one would expect given the results of similar
treatments in Pennsylvania (the long qualification period/low bonus treatment) and Washington
(the long qualification period/medium bonus treatment), although this latter treatment, as already
noted, is anomalously low in comparison with the other Washington results.
Although providing a full explanation of the differences among the various bonus offers
is beyond the scope of this paper, the differences across experiments may be explained in part by
reference to features of the experiments other than the bonus offers themselves. For example,
base period earnings were highest in Washington State and lowest in Illinois, but UI benefit levels
were highest in Pennsylvania. As a result, the mean replacement rate (defined simply as the ratio
of the average weekly UI benefit to the average weekly base period earnings) was highest in
Pennsylvania at about .6, and lower in both Illinois and Washington at about .5 (the replacement
rates are not shown in Table 1). Also, workers' weekly earnings before and after the spell of
insured unemployment were nearly identical in Illinois, but in Pennsylvania, post-unemployment

5

Note that in both cases, the formal statistical tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the treatments had no effect.
We take the point estimates at face value, however, on the assumption that large enough samples would reveal effects
of the magnitude reflected by the point estimates.
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earnings were somewhat lower than pre-unemployment earnings, whereas in Washington postunemployment earnings were higher than pre-unemployment earnings. Finally, average spells
of insured unemployment were considerably longer in Illinois (over 19 weeks on average for
controls) than in either Pennsylvania or Washington (about 16 and 15 weeks respectively). Some
of these differences could influence the experimental outcomes, and one advantage of the model
developed next is that it accounts for these differences in translating the bonus effects into other
behavioral impacts.
In summary, two results are consistent across all three bonus experiments. First, all three
experiments provide evidence that financial incentives do influence job search behavior and the
duration of unemployment, with larger bonus offers and longer qualification periods tending to
induce workers to shorten their unemployment spells by more than smaller bonus offers and
shorter qualification periods. Second, the shorter spells of insured unemployment that resulted
from the bonus offers did not come at the expense of lower earnings after reemployment. This
latter is arguably the most important finding of the reemployment bonus experiments because it
suggests that bonus-offered workers shortened their spells of unemployment by increasing their
search intensity rather than by lowering their reservation wages. By inference, the finding
suggests that UI lengthens unemployment spells mainly by reducing job search intensity rather
than by increasing the reservation wage.
III. The Model
Our goal is to translate the experimental results of the reemployment bonus experiments
into impacts of UI generosity on unemployment duration. To do this, we employ a partial
equilibrium matching model of the labor market in which unemployed workers search randomly
among firms for employment. After workers have applied for a job, firms with vacancies
randomly select workers from their pool of applicants. Each unemployed worker chooses his or
her optimal search effort—the number of firms to contact—by equating the marginal benefit from
increasing search effort with the associated marginal cost. To obtain results on the impact of
changes in the UI replacement rate and potential duration of UI benefits, we solve the model for
different replacement rates and potential benefit durations, and compare outcomes. The basic
structure of our model is similar to the one used in Davidson and Woodbury (1993, 1995).
We require a model that is institutionally rich, yet tractable. Accordingly, we introduce
three categories of unemployed workers. The first consists of workers who are ineligible for
unemployment insurance. We refer to such workers as UI-ineligibles and use Ui to denote the
number of such workers in the steady-state equilibrium. UI-ineligibles are generally workers with
relatively weak attachments to the labor force—new labor force entrants and reentrants—and
typically account for roughly 60 percent of the unemployed (Blank and Card 1991). We denote
the proportion of the unemployed who are UI-ineligible by q, and set it equal to .6.

6
The second category of unemployed workers consists of those who are eligible for UI, but
do not bother to claim their benefits. We refer to these workers as UI-eligible non-claimants and
use Uk to denote the number of them in the steady-state equilibrium. We include these workers
in the model because the fraction of UI-eligible workers who claim benefits—the UI take-up
rate—is less than 100 percent. If we denote the UI take-up rate by k, then the proportion of UIeligible workers who fail to claim their benefits is 1 - k. Recent work by Blank and Card (1991)
indicates that k falls in a range between .65 and .75. (We set k = .75 in our model. This choice
is somewhat arbitrary, but the results are insensitive to changes in k in the range of .65 to .75.)
Although there are probably a variety of reasons why workers who are eligible for benefits do
not claim those benefits, we assume that they expect to be reemployed rapidly, so that the
expected benefit from claiming their benefits falls short of the cost of doing so. This assumption
is not crucial for what follows.
Finally, we refer to the remainder of the unemployed as UI-eligible claimants and use Ut
to denote the number of such workers who are receiving benefits and are in their tth period of
search. We assume that these workers exhaust their eligibility after T periods of unemployment
and use Ue to denote the number of UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their benefits in the
steady-state equilibrium.
We describe the model in four steps. First, we introduce three accounting identities that
describe the distribution of the workforce (between employment and unemployment), the
distribution of jobs (between employment and vacancies), and the distribution of unemployed
workers (among UI-ineligibles, UI-eligible non-claimants, and UI-eligible claimants, both
recipients and exhaustees). In the second step, we equate the flows into and out of each state of
unemployment to yield a steady-state. Third, we demonstrate how search effort translates into
reemployment probabilities. Finally, we define optimal search effort for each unemployed
worker.
A. Identities
Since UI-claimants must be certified for benefits every two weeks, we measure time in
two-week intervals. Let F denote the total number of jobs available, J represent the total number
of available jobs that are filled, and V represent the number of job vacancies in the steady-state
equilibrium. Then, since all jobs are either filled or vacant, we have:
(1)

F = V + J.

In addition, since all workers in the labor force must be either employed or unemployed, we
have:
(2)

L=U+J

where L denotes the total number of workers and U represents total unemployment.
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The final identity divides unemployed workers into UI-ineligibles, UI-eligible nonclaimants, and UI-eligible claimants who are receiving benefits, and UI-eligible claimants who
have exhausted their benefits:
(3)

U = Ui + Uk +

t=1,T

Ut + Ue.

B. Steady-State Conditions
The second set of equations equates the flows into and out of each employment state.
These equations must hold to insure that total unemployment and its composition remain constant
in steady-state. Let s denote the rate of job separation or turnover—that is, the probability that
a randomly chosen employed worker will lose his or her job in any given period. Thus, sJ
worker lose their job in each period. Of these, qsJ are UI-ineligible. It follows that the flow into
state Ui is qsJ. To calculate the flow out of this state, let mi denote the reemployment (or job
match) probability for a typical UI-ineligible worker. Then the flow out of Ui is miUi. Equating
these flows yields the first steady-state condition:
(4)

qsJ = miUi

Applying the same logic to the class of UI-eligible non-claimants yields
(5)

(1-q)(1-k)sJ = mkUk

where mk denotes the reemployment probability for UI-eligible non-claimants.
Next, turn to the UI-eligible claimants. Let mt denote the reemployment probability for
a UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search and let me play the same role for UI-eligible
claimants who have exhausted their benefits. Then, of the Ut workers in their tth period of
search, mtUt find jobs and the remaining (1- mt)Ut do not. Those who find jobs move to state
J while those who do not move on to state Ut+1. It follows that all workers who begin the period
in state Ut flow out of that state at the end of the period and that the flow into state Ut+1 is given
by (mt-1)Ut-1. Equating these flows yields the following steady-state conditions
(6)

(1-q)ksJ = U1

(7)

(1-mt-1)Ut-1 = Ut

for 2

t

T

UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their benefits leave state Ue if and only if they find a
job, which happens with probability me. Entry into state Ue occurs if workers fail to find
employment after T periods of search. Thus, the flows into and out of state Ue are equal if:
(8)

(1-mT)UT = meUe
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If equations (4)-(8) hold, unemployment and its composition remain constant over time;
that is, a steady-state exists.
C. Reemployment Probabilities
The probability that a searching worker finds a job is a function of his or her own search
effort, the search effort of other workers, and the slackness or tightness of the labor market. We
use pt to denote the search effort of a UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search. The terms
pi, pk, and pe denote the search effort of UI-ineligible workers, UI-eligible non-claimants, and
UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their benefits, respectively. Each of the p terms gives
the probability that a worker contacts a firm and applies for a job (or, if p > 1, the number of
firms contacted by the worker) in any given period. Assuming that workers choose firms at
random, the probability that any given firm has a vacancy is V/F. Thus, the probability that a
worker contacts a firm with a vacancy is p(V/F). If we let denote the average number of
applications filed per firm, then the probability that a worker gets a job conditional on applying
to a firm with a vacancy is (1 - e- )/ (see Davidson and Woodbury 1993). Thus, the probability
of a UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search finding a job is given by:
(9)

mt=pt(V/F)[(1 - e- )/ ]

for 1

t

T.

where = (1/F)[piUi + pkUk + t=1,TptUt + peUe]. The analogous conditions for the UIineligibles, UI-eligible non-claimants, and UI-exhaustees are:
(10)

mi = pi(V/T)[(1 - e- )/ ]

(11)

mk = pk(V/F)[(1 - e- )/ ]

(12)

me = pe(V/F)[(1 - e- )/ ].

Note that the search effort of other workers enters into each workers reemployment probability
through .
D. Optimal Search Effort
We assume that workers choose search effort to maximize expected lifetime income.
Workers can increase the probability of reemployment by increasing search effort, but doing so
is costly. We assume that the cost of search is a function of search effort, p, and specify the
search cost function as cpz, where c and z are search cost parameters. Note that z (> 1) denotes
the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort. We assume that the parameter c differs
between UI-eligible and UI-ineligible workers (we refer to it as c for UI-eligibles and ci for UIineligibles), but that z is the same for all.
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To calculate expected lifetime income we must consider both the current and future
prospects faced by the each worker. For example, let Vt denote the expected lifetime income of
an unemployed UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search; let Vw denote the expected lifetime
income of an employed UI-eligible claimant; let w represent the wage earned by such a worker
when employed; and let x denote unemployment benefits. Then, an unemployed UI-eligible
claimant in the tth period of search earns x - c(pt)z currently. With probability mt this worker
finds a job and can expect to earn Vw in the future. With the remaining probability, 1-mt, the
worker remains unemployed and can expect to earn Vt+1 in the future. Therefore,
(13) Vt= x-c(pt)z+[mtVw+(1-mt)Vt+1]/(1+r) for 1 t T.
Note that future income is discounted, with r denoting the interest rate. An analogous condition
describes the expected lifetime income of workers in every other state of unemployment. If we
let Ve and Vi denote the expected lifetime incomes of a UI-claimant who has exhausted benefits
and an unemployed UI-ineligible worker, then we have:
(14)

Ve = - c(pe)z + [meVw + (1 - me)Ve]/(1 + r)

(15)

Vi = - ci(pi)z + [miVwi + (1 - mi)Vi]/(1 + r)

Recall that Vw is the expected lifetime income of an employed UI-eligible worker, and let
Vwi denote the expected lifetime income of an employed UI-ineligible worker. To calculate Vw
and Vwi we follow the procedure outlined already. Current income equals the worker's wage,
w (or wi if UI-ineligible). With probability (1 - s) this worker keeps his job for another period
and continues to earn Vw (or Vwi if UI-ineligible). With probability s the worker loses his job
and has to search for new employment, resulting in a future income of V1 (or Vi if UI-ineligible).
Therefore,
(16)

Vw = w + [sV1 + (1 - s)Vw]/(1 + r)

(17)

Vwi = wi + [sVi + (1 - s)Vwi]/(1 + r).

For each unemployed worker, search effort is chosen to maximize expected lifetime
income. Therefore, we have the following equations defining optimal search effort for all but one
possible state of unemployment
(18)

pt = arg max Vt

(19)

pe = arg max Ve

(20)

pi = arg max Vi.

for 1

t

T
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The one exception is made for UI-eligible non-claimants. Presumably, these workers do
not claim UI benefits because they do not expect to be unemployed for a significant length of
time—that is, they expect to be able to find jobs relatively easily and with little effort. Therefore,
we treat these workers differently, by assigning them a high reemployment probability and
ignoring their search decision. Provided that their reemployment probability is set high enough
(so that their expected duration of unemployment is roughly half the expected duration faced by
UI-eligible claimants), our results are not sensitive to this assumption.
IV. Calibration
In order to solve the model, we must first set values of its parameters. We begin by
dividing the model's parameters into three categories. First, we have parameters that have either
been estimated directly in previous work or that can be inferred from estimates of other variables
in previous work. These include the separation rate (s), total jobs available (F), the size of the
labor force (L), the fraction of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI benefits (q), the
UI take-up rate (k), and the interest rate (r).
The second set consists of variables that are observable and can be taken directly from the
data collected to analyze the three reemployment bonus experiments. Included in this set are
wages or earnings (w and wi) and unemployment benefits (x).
The third set consists of variables that have not been previously estimated and that cannot
be observed directly—the search cost parameters c, ci, and z.
The reasoning used to obtain values of parameters in the first category is described in
detail elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 1993, 1995). Here, we simply report the range of
values considered and cite the sources used to support our choices. Recall that we measure time
in 2-week intervals since UI claimants are typically certified for 2 weeks of benefits at a time.
With that in mind, we use values of s (the bi-weekly separation rate) ranging from .006 to .014,
with s = .010 considered to be the best estimate (Ehrenberg 1980; Clark and Summers 1982; and
Murphy and Topel 1987). Since the system of equations is homogeneous of degree zero in F and
L, we can set L = 100 without loss of generality. We consider values for F ranging from 95 to
97.5, with F=96.25 considered the best estimate (inferred from values of the ratio of
unemployment to vacancies reported in Abraham 1983). As mentioned above, we set q (the
fraction of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI benefits) equal to .6 and k (the UI takeup rate) equal to .75 (Blank and Card 1991). For the interest rate, we consider values ranging
from .002 to .020 with r = .008 considered the best estimate. Thus, we have a "reference case"
in which s = .01, r = .008, and T = 96.25. As we show below, as long as these parameters
remain in the ranges described above, our results are remarkably robust to changes in the
parameter values.
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The wages and UI benefit levels used for each bonus treatment are displayed in Table 1.
(Since Table 1 reports values in weekly terms, we multiply by 2.) For each treatment, we use
the average of the control group and the treatment group. For example, in Pennsylvania the biweekly UI benefit amount for the control group was approximately $328, and the bi-weekly UI
benefit amount for the long qualification period/high bonus treatment group was $330. Therefore,
when analyzing the Pennsylvania long qualification period/high bonus treat-ment, we set x =
$329.6
We use the information we have on bonus effects to infer values of the search cost
parameters. For a given set of search cost parameters, the model predicts an expected duration
of unemployment for each class of worker and a bonus effect for UI-eligible claimants. Let D
denote the expected duration of unemployment predicted by the model in the absence of the bonus
for UI-eligible claimants, and let D denote these workers' bonus-induced change in
unemployment duration, again as predicted by the model. The actual values of D and D for
each experiment are reported in Table 1. For example, in Illinois D = 19.27 and D -.71. For
each experiment, we choose search cost parameters such that the values of D and D predicted
by the model match those reported in Table 1.7 This yields a vector of search cost parameters
that makes the model's prediction as close as possible to the actual outcome of each experimental
treatment.
To investigate the impact of varying x (the level of UI benefits), and T (the potential
duration of UI benefits), we solve the model for a variety of x and T values and compare the
outcomes. Increasing x or T decreases the opportunity cost of unemployment for UI-eligible
claimants, resulting in a decrease in search effort. The decrease in search effort increases their
duration of unemployment, decreases steady-state employment, and may increase the number of
jobs held by other workers. By solving the model for different values of x and T, we can
estimate the magnitude of these different impacts.
V. Results
Table 2 displays the main results of our efforts to translate the reemployment bonus effects
into (a) impacts of a 10-percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate on unemployment
duration; and (b) impacts of adding 1 week to the potential duration of UI benefits.

6

The proper wage to use in implementing the model is arguably the reemployment wage (column 7 of Table 1)
rather than the base period wage. As it turns out, the base period wage and the reemployment wage are close enough
that use of either yields similar results.
7

The expected durations of unemployment and the treatment impacts shown in Table 1 are actually in terms of
durations of insured unemployment and changes in insured unemployment. Our model, on the other hand, is stated in
terms of spells of actual joblessness (not just insured unemployment). Accordingly, we have adjusted the treatment
effects shown in Table 1 so as to reflect the expected durations of unemployment and changes in unemployment duration
induced by each bonus offer. These adjustments are described in Davidson and Woodbury (1991).
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Column 1 of Table 2 shows the estimated impact of a 10 percentage point increase in the
UI replacement rate—the ratio of weekly UI benefits to pre-unemployment wage—on the expected
duration of unemployment of UI-eligible claimants. The estimates cover a range of roughly .5
to 1.1 weeks. That is, a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate is predicted to
increase the expected duration of UI-eligible workers by between .5 and 1.1 weeks. This range
is in the middle of the existing empirical estimates reviewed in the introduction—that range runs
from a low of about zero to a high of over 1.5 weeks. However, most of the range lies above
Hamermesh's (1977) "best estimate" of one-half week. The range we obtain is more in keeping
with some of the more recent findings, such as Solon's (1985), whose estimates are in the range
of .5 to 1 week.
The second column of Table 2 shows that increases in the UI replacement rate can be
expected to shorten the unemployment spells of UI-ineligibles. That is, since an increase in the
UI replacement rate reduces the search effort of UI claimants, the competition for jobs is reduced
so that UI-ineligibles (whose search effort is essentially unchanged by the increase in the UI
replacement rate) have a higher probability of getting a job offer when they apply for a job. The
estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate shortens the
expected unemployment spells of UI-ineligibles by about half a day to a day (that is, on the order
of one-tenth to two-tenths of a week). Although this is not a large effect, it does suggests that
UI benefit increases reduce job competition and make it easier for UI-ineligibles to find work.
We have omitted three of the six Washington treatments from the results shown in Table
2—the short qualification period/low bonus treatment, the short qualification period/medium
bonus treatment, and the long qualification period/medium bonus treatment. These three bonus
treatments produced relatively small effects and thus generated small predicted impacts on the
expected duration of unemployment. For all three, the estimated impact of a 10 percentage point
increase in the replacement rate on D falls in the range of .3 to .4 week, and the impact on Di
falls in the range of -.1 to -.05.
Whether we should expand the range of estimates to include these Washington treatments
is a judgement call. The treatment effects in question were so small that they are inconsistent
with the findings from the other bonus offers in Washington as well as in Illinois and
Pennsylvania. On the other hand, excluding findings of a small treatment effect in three cases
out of a total of 11 is quite arbitrary—we may be throwing away real information here. In any
case, if we include these three Washington treatments in our range of estimates, then we would
conclude that a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate is predicted to increase
the expected duration of UI-eligible workers by between .3 and 1.1 weeks. This range is
consistent with existing estimates of the disincentive effects of UI, but the extent to which it
narrows that range is disappointing. Indeed, from the viewpoint of policy, a range of .3 to 1.1
weeks is hardly more informative than a range of 0 to 1.5 weeks.
The third column of Table 3 shows the estimated impact of a 1-week increase in the
potential duration of UI benefits on the expected duration of unemployment for UI-eligible
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claimants. The estimates fall in the range of .1 to .2 week, implying that a 10-week benefit
extension would increase the expected duration of unemployment by between 1 and 2 weeks.
These estimates are clearly toward the low end of the existing empirical estimates of the impact
of extending benefits—recall that those estimates fall in the range of .1 to .4 week.
The fourth column of Table 2 shows that extending the potential duration of benefits can
be expected to make it slightly easier for UI-ineligibles to find jobs. Specifically, the estimates
suggest that a 1-week increase in the potential duration of benefits shortens the expected duration
of unemployment of UI-ineligibles by about one-quarter of a day. This is a very small effect, but
it illustrates that job competition is reduced when UI benefits are extended.
The three omitted Washington treatments yield relatively small estimates of the impact of
extending the potential duration of UI benefits. For those three treatments, the estimated impact
of a 1-period increase in the potential duration of UI benefits on D is in the range of .05 to .08,
and the impact on Di is in the range of -.02 to -.01. If we include these three treatments, then
our range of estimates widens, and we would conclude that a one week increase in the potential
duration of benefits increases the expected duration of unemployment by between .05 and .2
week. The implication is that a 10-week benefit extension would increase the expected duration
of unemployment by between one-half and 2 weeks. Again, this is clearly at the low end of
existing estimates, and suggests that the disincentive effects UI extensions may be less than
previously believed.
It is important to determine whether the impacts found above vary depending on the initial
replacement rate or the initial potential duration of unemployment. That is, if the replacement
rate were .1 or .9 to begin with (rather than .5 or .6), would the impacts that we estimate be
different? Similarly, if the potential duration of benefits were 16 or 40 weeks to begin with
(rather than 26 weeks), would the results differ? Table 3 shows that the estimated impacts do not
vary much with the initial UI replacement rate or with the initial potential duration of benefits.
For example, the results shown suggest that, depending on the initial replacement rate, a 10
percentage point increase in the replacement rate would lengthen unemployment by as little as
.761 week or as much as .816 week (see the first and second columns of Table 3). This is a
variation of only a quarter of a day (.055 week) in response to dramatic variation in the initial
replacement rate. Similarly, the variation in response to a one week benefit extension that results
from changing the initial potential duration of benefits is of little significance (see the right three
columns of Table 3). Similar results were found for Pennsylvania and Washington. We conclude
that the results are largely insensitive to the initial replacement rate or initial potential duration
of benefits.
It is also important to examine the sensitivity of the results to variation in some of the key
parameters that we have obtained from secondary sources. Table 4 shows how the main estimates
vary with changes in the separation rate (s) and total available jobs (F). We show results for the
reference case (s = .01, F = 96.25), for high and low values of s (.006 being low and .014 being
high), and for high and low values of F (95 being low and 97.5 being high). The sensitivity
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analysis is shown for the Illinois treatment, for one treatment in Pennsylvania (the long
qualification period/high bonus treatment), and for one Washington treatment (the short
qualification period/high bonus treatment). (The Pennsylvania and Washington treatments
selected each gave results that were in the middle of the range of their respective experiment.)
The main finding of the sensitivity analysis shown in Table 4 is that the results are
generally quite insensitive to changes in F (total available jobs), but somewhat sensitive to change
in s (the separation rate). Consider first the impact of a 10 percentage point increase in the
replacement rate. The Pennsylvania reference case shown suggests that such an increase would
lengthen unemploy-ment by .627 week. For low F, the estimate is .629, and for high F, the
estimate is .627. Hence, the results are robust to variation in F. (Similar results obtain for the
Illinois and Washington cases shown.) But for low s, the estimate is .677, whereas for high s,
it is .577. Thus, we have variation of about one-half day (.1 week) in response to varying s
between .006 and .014. (Again, the Illinois and Washington cases shown give similar results.)
Based on this finding, it might be wise to widen further (perhaps by .1 week on each side) the
range discussed above for the impact of a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate.
But doing so would not basically alter our conclusions.
Consider next the impact of a one week extension of the potential duration of UI benefits.
The Pennsylvania reference case suggests that a one week extension would lengthen
unemployment by .15 week. For low F, the estimate is .178, and for high F, the estimate is
again .15. For low s, the estimate is .177, whereas for high s, it is .144. These
variations—about .03 week in each case, or less than a quarter of a day—are probably too small
to worry about (the Illinois and Washington cases shown give similar results.) However, they
may suggest a need to broaden slightly the range discussed above for the impact of a one week
extension of UI benefits.
In short, the results shown in Table 4 suggest that choosing different values of the s and
F parameters might widen slightly the estimated ranges of UI impacts, but would not change our
basic inferences.
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
Our main goal has been to translate the effects of reemployment bonus offers, as estimated
in three separate UI field experiments, into estimates of the disincentive effects of UI that have
been of most concern to economists and policy-makers—that is, the effects of changes in the UI
replacement rate and the potential duration of UI benefits on unemployment duration. An
advantage of the findings presented here is that the logic of verification underlying them is quite
different from that underlying earlier empirically-based findings on the incentive effects of the
UI system. Yet the estimates presented clearly fall within the ranges of the earlier estimates, and
arguably narrow those ranges.
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We have four main findings. First, a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement
rate can be expected to increase the unemployment duration of UI claimants by between .3 and
1.1 weeks (see Table 2 and the accompanying discussion). Existing empirical work offers a
somewhat broader range than this, placing the expected increase in unemployment duration
anywhere from zero to slightly over 1.5 weeks. The estimates presented here might be viewed
as providing evidence that the range may be somewhat narrower—but not much narrower—than
previously estimated. However, from a policy perspective, there is some question whether a range
of .3 to 1.1 weeks is any more informative than a range of 0 to 1.5 weeks.
Second, we find that a one week increase in the potential duration of benefits increases the
expected duration of unemployment by between .05 and .2 week (see again Table 2 and the
accompanying discussion). The implication is that a 10-week benefit extension would increase
the expected duration of unemployment by between one-half week and two weeks. This is clearly
at the low end of existing estimates of the disincentive effects of UI benefit extensions.
Third, increases in the UI replacement rate and the potential duration of benefits reduce
the job search intensity of UI claimants so that unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI face
less competition for jobs. The result is shorter spells of unemployment for UI-ineligibles. We
estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate shortens the expected
unemployment spell of an average UI-ineligible worker by about one-half day to a day. Also, a
1-week increase in the potential duration of benefits shortens the expected unemployment spell
of an average UI-ineligible by about one-quarter of a day. These are admittedly very small
effects, but they do illustrate that increasing the generosity of UI benefits reduces job competition
and has benefits for workers who are ineligible for UI.
Fourth, we find that the disincentive effects of increases in the UI replacement rate and
extensions of UI benefits are invariant to the initial replacement rate or the initial potential
duration of benefits. That is, at least when they are averaged over fairly large groups, the
disincentive effects of UI appear to be similar whether the initial replacement rate is high or low,
and whether the initial potential duration of benefits is high or low (see Table 3 and the
accompanying discussion).
Because these estimates are based on randomized trials, they are arguably free of many
of the complicating and contaminating factors that plague nonexperimental estimates. Moreover,
there is no particular reason to favor or disfavor any of the estimates, in that each arises from a
similar experimental design that was implemented and monitored with some care. In that respect,
it is striking that we find a range of estimates that is nearly as broad as that in the existing
literature. Existing studies are based on various data and various econometric techniques, each
of which might be expected to add variation to the range of estimates independent of variation in
the actual behavior underlying those estimates. In other words, the results presented here suggest
substantial variation in the behavior of unemployed workers, even when measurement of that
behavior is averaged over rather large groups. At the least, the results suggest that it is

16
unwise—and perhaps futile—to try to concoct summary "best estimates" of the disincentive effects
of increasing the UI replacement rate or extending the potential duration of UI benefits.
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Table 1
Basic Features of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments: Means
(with Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Experimental
Treatment

Qualification
Period
(1)

Weekly
Weekly Weeks of Insured Treatment
Base
Benefit
Unemployment
Effect in
Period
Bonus
(Benefit Year)
weeks
Amount Earnings Amount
(4)
(5)
(6)
(3)
(2)

Weekly
Reemployment
Earnings
(7)

Illinois Experiment
Treatment
(FSC-ineligible)

11
(0)

$500
(0)

$261
(4.8)

$121
(1.0)

18.56
(.25)

-.71*
(.34)

$240
(6.1)

Control
(FSC-ineligible)

--

--

250
(4.5)

122
(1.0)

19.27
(.23)

--

247
(5.7)

Pennsylvania Experiment
Short qual.
period/low
bonus

6
(0)

500
(5.6)

279
(5.6)

167
(1.9)

15,54
(.28)

-.40
(.34)

252
(6.7)

Short qual.
period/high
bonus

6
(0)

1003
(9.4)

276
(4.6)

167
(1.6)

15.44
(.25)

-.50*
(.31)

267
(7.0)

Long qual.
period/low
bonus

12
(0)

499
(4.3)

281
(4.4)

166
(1.4)

15.51
(.22)

-.43
(.28)

268
(5.4)

Long qual.
period/high
bonus

12
(0)

991
(7.6)

267
(4.4)

165
(1.3)

15.02
(.19)

-.93*
(.27)

273
(3.7)

Control

--

--

272
(3.5)

164
(1.2)

15.94
(.18)

--

263
(4.7)

Washington Experiment
Short qual.
period/low
bonus

5.7
(.02)

302
(2.2)

296
(4.3)

151
(1.1)

15.14
(.23)

-.07
(.30)

317
(6.9)

Short qual.
period/med.
bonus

5.8
(.02)

610
(4.3)

302
(4.3)

153
(1.1)

15.05
(.22)

-.16
(.30)

324
(6.7)

Short qual.
period/high
bonus

5.7
(.02)

917
(7.8)

298
(5.1)

153
(1.3)

14.61
(.27)

-.61*
(.34)

315
(7.3)

Table 1
(Continued)

Experimental
Treatment

Qualification
Period
(1)
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Weekly
Base
Weekly Weeks of Insured Treatment
Period
Benefit
Unemployment
Effect in
Bonus
(Benefit Year)
weeks
Amount Earnings Amount
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(2)

Weekly
Reemployment
Earnings
(7)

Long qual.
period/low
bonus

11.0
(.04)

308
(2.1)

302
(4.1)

154
(1.1)

14.71
(.23)

-.50*
(.30)

321
(6.6)

Long qual.
period/med.
bonus

11.0
(.04)

612
(4.3)

306
(4.5)

153
(1.1)

15.08
(.23)

-.14
(.30)

319
(6.5)

Long qual.
period/high
bonus

11.1
(.04)

923
(8.0)

307
(5.4)

154
(1.3)

14.50
(.28)

-.72*
(.34)

326
(8.8)

--

--

296
(3.6)

151
(0.9)

15.21
(.20)

--

321
(6.5)

Control

Notes: Author's tabulations of the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington Reemployment Bonus Public Use Data files.
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero using a 10-percent significance level.
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Table 2
Change in Expected Duration of Unemployment
in Response to Changes in the UI Replacement Rate
and Potential Duration of UI Benefits, Reference Case
Response of Expected Duration of Unemployment to:
10 percentage point
increase in the
replacement rate
Experimental
Treatment
Illinois (FSC-ineligible)

D
(UI-eligible
claimants)

1 week increase in
potential duration
of UI benefits

Di
(UI-ineligible)

D
(UI-eligible
claimants)

Di
(UI-ineligibles)

.815

-.203

.194

-.051

Short qual. period/low bonus

.777

-.211

.184

-.052

Short qual. period/high bonus

.418

-.121

.114

-.030

Long qual. period/low bonus

.532

-.136

.125

-.033

Long qual. period/high bonus

.627

-.125

.150

-.041

Short qual. period/high bonus

.653

-.177

.128

-.036

Long qual. period/low bonus

1.113

-.348

.219

-.071

Long qual. period/high bonus

.575

-.152

.111

-.031

Pennsylvania

Washington*

* For other Washington treatments, see text.
Notes: D is the change in expected duration of unemployment of UI-eligible claimants (in weeks;); Di is the change
expected duration unemployment of UI-Ineligible workers (in weeks).
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Table 3
Variation in Response to Changes in the UI Replacement Rate and Potential
Duration of Benefits: Results Based on Illinois Experiment
Response to a 10
percentage point increase
in the replacement rate

Initial
Potential
Duration
of UI
Benefits

Response to a 1 week
increase in potential duration of UI
benefits

Initial
Replacement
Rate

D
(UI-eligible
claimants)

.000

.761

-.195

16

.180

-.049

.100

.778

-.198

18

.185

-.050

.200

.791

-.201

20

.190

-.050

.300

.803

-.202

22

.193

-.051

.400

.811

-.203

24

.194

-.051

.500

.816

-.203

26

.194

-.051

.600

.816

-.201

28

.194

-.050

.700

.811

-.198

30

.192

-.050

.800

.801

-.194

32

.191

-.049

.900

.784

-.188

34

.185

-.049

Di
(UI-ineligible)

36

Notes: See Table 2.

D
(UI-eligible
claimants)

.183

Di
(UI-ineligible)

-.048

38

.179

-.047

40

.175

-.046
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Table 4
Sensitivity of Results to Changes in the Separation Rate(s)
and Number of Jobs Available (F)
Response to Expected Duration of Unemployment to:
10 percentage point increase in
replacement rate

1 week increase in potential duration
of UI benefits

D
(UI-eligible
claimant)

Di
(UI-ineligible)

D
(UI-eligible
claimants)

Di
(UI-ineligibles)

s low

.879

-.303

.211

-.076

F low

.819

-.229

.215

-.050

Reference Case

.815

-.203

.194

-.051

s high

.747

-.157

.182

-.040

F high

.817

-.225

.195

-.046

Illinois (FSC-ineligible)

Pennsylvania (Long qualification period/high bonus)
s low

.677

-.156

.177

-.057

F low

.629

-.141

.178

-.040

Reference Case

.627

-.125

.150

-.041

s high

.577

-.101

.144

-.036

F high

.627

-.143

.150

-.039

Washington (short qualification period/high bonus)
s low

.679

-.209

.143

-.048

F low

.653

-.193

.128

-.035

Reference Case

.653

-.177

.128

-.036

s high

.615

-.159

.124

-.032

F high

.655

-.197

.128

-.035

Notes: See Table 2.

